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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 





Control No.: 09-046-19 SC 
Andre Patterson 95A5506 
Otisville Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 8 
Otisville, New York 10963 · 
Decision appealed: August 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
Board Member(s) Agostini, Smith, Corley 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Letter-briefreceived October 16~ 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the. Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied ·upon: Pre-Sentence Investig.ation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole . 
Board.Release Decision N9tice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case . . Plan. - . - - . - . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . .. 
Fiilai Jte~ ersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
· _Vacated, remanded fo r de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
_ ...__....:::;:;...._-_-_-_-_- _-_- ~~ed _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview - ·-. Modified to _ __ _ 
/ 
Affirmed _Vacated, remanded fo r de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
If the ·Final Determination is at variance with Find_in~s and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
:fhis Final Detenn.ination, the rel~ted Statement of the Appeals Unit'. s Findi.ng~ and the separ_ tefin?~ngs o_f 
the Parole Board, 1f any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any; on :~ V/c.A .J 66 . 
. I 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant -. Appellant's Counsel - In'st Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/201 8) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Patterson, Andre DIN: 95-A-5506  
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   Appellant challenges the August 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
an 18-month hold. Appellant’s instant offenses involved three armed robberies of stores within 
two days, and in two of the robberies shooting the victims for no reason. One of the victims died 
from his wounds. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board failed to consider and/or 
properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) no aggravating factors exist. 3) the decision lacks 
substantial evidence. 4) the Board failed to list any factors in support of the statutory standard 
cited. 5) the Board decision illegally resentenced him. 6) the decision lacks detail. 7) the decision 
violated his due process liberty interest. 8) the decision violated his 8th amendment liberty interest 
in that he was a juvenile when he committed these crimes. 9) the Board failed to comply with the 
2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the COMPAS was ignored, the attempted departure 
was done illegally, the statutes are rehabilitation focused, and the regulation creates a constitutional 
liberty interest (which include a right to confront the evidence against him, a right to counsel). 
 
   Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient 
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if 
such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his 
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of 
his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
   The Board’s emphasis on the violent nature of the crime does not establish irrationality bordering 
on impropriety. Pulliam v Dennison, 38 A.D.3d 963, 832 N.Y.S.2d 304 (3d Dept. 2007); Sterling v 
Dennison, 38 A.D.3d 1145, 833 N.Y.S.2d 684 (3d  Dept. 2007); Marziale v Alexander, 62 A.D.3d 
1227, 879 N.Y.S.2d 636 (3d Dept. 2009). The Board may conclude that the violent nature of the crime 
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is an overriding consideration warranting the denial of parole release. Rodney v Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 
1152, 805 N.Y.S.2d 743 (3d  Dept. 2005). The Board may emphasize the violent nature of the instant 
offense. Marnell v Dennison, 35 A.D.3d 995, 824 N.Y.S.2d 812 (3d Dept. 2006), lv.den. 8 N.Y.3d 
807, 833 N.Y.S.2d 426 (2007). 
   Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other 
appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered.  Matter 
of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). 
Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not 
be given equal weight.  Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 
156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017);  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 
A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
   The Board can give greater weight to statements made in the sentencing minutes. Williams v New 
York State Division of Parole, 114 A.D.3d 992, 979 N.Y.S.2d 868 (3d Dept. 2014). The Board is 
entitled to rely on the sentencing minutes. Platten v New York State Board of Parole, 153 A.D.3d 
1509, 59 N.Y.S.3d 921 (3d Dept. 2017).  
    The Board may consider a district attorney’s recommendation to deny parole.  Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker 
v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).  
   The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
   That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
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Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”); Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 
920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale). 
   The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
   Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
   An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of 
a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 
99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
   Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence on 
which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
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is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018). Parole release is a statutory grant of a restricted form of liberty prior to the 
expiration of a sentence. Johnson v Superintendent Adirondack Correctional Facility, 174 A.D.3d 
992, 106 N.Y.S.3d 408 (3d Dept. 2019). 
    There are no substantial evidence issues in Parole Board Release Interviews.  Matter of Tatta v. 
Dennison, 26 A.D.3d 663, 809 N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 714, 816 N.Y.S.2d 
750 (2006); Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 A.D.3d 904, 905, 796 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dept. 2005); 
cf. Matter of Horace v. Annucci, 133 A.D.3d 1263, 20 N.Y.S.3d 492 (4th Dept. 2015). 
 
   The Board is required to consider Petitioner’s youth (under 18) in relation to the commission of 
the instant offense for which he is serving a maximum life sentence pursuant to the Third 
Department’s decision in Matter of Hawkins v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. 
Supervision, 140 A.D.3d 34, 39, 30 N.Y.S.3d 397, 400 (3d Dept. 2016), and the Board’s amended 
regulation, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(c).  The case precedent did not abrogate the requirements of 
Executive Law § 259-i.  Thus, the Board must consider an inmate’s youth and subsequent growth 
and maturity in addition to other relevant factors and principles, such as disciplinary records and 
programming, the risks and needs assessment, recommendations from relevant parties, as well as 
the underlying offense.  See, e.g., Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 
(3d Dept.), lv. denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018). Here, the transcript reveals that there was extensive 
discussion with the appellant about his circumstances in his youth, his living arrangements, and 
contacts that led him to a life of crime. The Board also noted in the interview, and in the decision, 
the changes in his life since his youth. Thus, the Board covered all required areas. 
   In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
   Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law 
is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 
2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 
A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law amendments 
have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Patterson, Andre DIN: 95-A-5506  
Facility: Otisville CF AC No.:  09-046-19 SC 
    
Findings: (Page 5 of 6) 
 
 
     The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. And 
thus by definition, the 2017 regulations don’t create a constitutional liberty interest either. 
Administrative agencies are but creatures of the Legislature and are possessed only of those powers 
expressly or impliedly delegated by that body ( Finger Lakes Racing Assn. v New York State Racing 
& Wagering Bd., 45 NY2d 471, 480; Matter of City of Utica v Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 NY2d 
164, 168-169). The cornerstone of administrative law is derived from the principle that the 
Legislature may declare its will, and after fixing a primary standard, endow administrative agencies 
with the power to fill in the interstices in the legislative product by prescribing rules and regulations 
consistent with the enabling legislation" (Matter of Nicholas v Kahn, 47 N.Y.2d 24, 31, 389 N.E.2d 
1086, 416 N.Y.S.2d 565 [1979]). In so doing, an agency can adopt regulations that go beyond the 
text of that legislation, provided they are not inconsistent with the statutory language or its underlying 
purposes (Goodwin v Perales, 88 N.Y.2d 383, 395, 669 N.E.2d 234, 646 N.Y.S.2d 300 [1996]).    
Under the separation of powers doctrine, the legislature cannot delegate its lawmaking power to an 
administrative agency. However, the legislature may endow administrative agencies with the power 
to fill in the gaps in the legislative product by prescribing rules and regulations consistent with the 
enabling legislation. Nicholas v Kahn, 47 NY22 24 (1979). Since the enabling legislation doesn’t 
create any constitional liberty interest, then the regulations may not either. 
   Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do 
not represent a rehabilitation/forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental 
basis for release decisions.  This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  In 
2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 
985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never 
intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information 
from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 
amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of 
each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amendments 
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also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument 
cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  Rather, 
the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory 
factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  See Matter 
of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); 
accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board 
is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory factors.  
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); accord 
Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board still 
is entitled to place greater emphasis on the instant offense.  See Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 
A.D.3d 197, 203, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 
153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 
1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). 
   Amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) did not alter this approach.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 
27, 2017 at 2 (reaffirming “any [risk and needs] instrument used is not dispositive”).  Indeed, the 
COMPAS does not (and cannot) supersede the Board’s authority to determine, based on members’ 
independent judgment and application of section 259-i(2)(c)(A)’s factors, whether an inmate should 
be released.  See 2011 N.Y. Laws ch. 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 1; Matter of Montane, 116 
A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amended regulation was intended to increase 
transparency in the Board’s decision making by providing an explanation if and when the Board 
departs from scales in denying an inmate release.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 
2.   
 
   The departure in the Board decision was in compliance with the regulation, as the Board stated 
they were not confident appellant could live and remain at liberty without violating the law in the 
community. And, the Board decision cited the disciplinary score on the COMPAS and his violent 
instant offenses. So, reasons for the departure were given. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
